Economics Letters 86, 153-158 (2005).

ABSTRACT

This paper models a contractual process by a sequential mechanism, which mimics matching procedures for many-to-one real-life matching problems. In this framework, we provide a family of mechanisms implementing the student-optimal matching in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.

Working Paper Version: IVIE, WP-AD 1999-16

Journal Version: Economics Letters 86, 153-158 (2005).

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Last update: November 25, 2009